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THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF INTERPRETING
SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Christopher P. Banks*
At the beginning of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s last term, the New
York University Law School held a conference to honor the centennial
anniversary of the Fourteenth Amendment. Two Justices of the
Supreme Court, William Brennan and Earl Warren, gave introductory
and concluding presentations in the book that followed. Brennan
premised his remarks, titled “Landmarks of Legal Liberty,” on the idea
that the Supreme Court has an affirmative obligation to enforce the
rights’ protections found in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Brennan endorsed Congress’ decision, shortly after Reconstruction, to
enact specific civil rights legislation that expanded the Court’s
jurisdiction over the states and to realize the substantive promise of the
Amendment through judicial power. As Brennan rationalized,
Congress’ investiture of the federal judiciary with broad power to
enforce the limits imposed by the amendment reflects acceptance of
two fundamental propositions. First, it demonstrates a recognition that
written guarantees of liberty are mere paper protections without a
judiciary to define and enforce them. Second, it reflects acceptance of
the lesson taught by the history of man’s struggle for freedom that only
a truly independent judiciary can properly play the role of definer and
enforcer.1

As the passage reveals, Brennan’s conception of liberty (and
history) works in conjunction with his comprehension of what his role is
as a member of the federal courts and structures his non-interpretivism
in Enforcement Clause cases. For Brennan, Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the limited role of enacting laws designed to
*

Christopher P. Banks, Associate Professor of Political Science, The University of Akron. J.D.,
University of Dayton School of Law (1984); Ph.D, University of Virginia (1995).
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., Landmarks of Legal Liberty, in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
CENTENNIAL VOLUME 3-4 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1970).
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protect or expand upon rights that are a natural extension of the
Amendment, but it restricts Congress’ power to take away such
judicially-created rights.2
Chief Justice Warren’s remarks, styled “Fourteenth Amendment:
Retrospect and Prospect,” made clear that he shared his colleague’s
conviction that the attainment of the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise
of equality rested in large part with the Supreme Court’s discretion.3
Whereas Brennan believed that the Court was both the “definer and
enforcer” of Fourteenth Amendment freedom, Warren’s more sobering
historical account of the immediate period following the ratification of
the Civil War Amendments revealed that the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment mostly retarded Congress’
well-intention efforts up until 1875 (as expressed in five civil rights
statutes) to make the Negro more free in a white society.4 The Civil
Rights Cases5 and United States v. Harris6 demonstrated that the Court
failed to live up to its responsibility to help the Negro by adhering to a
“concept of federalism that was of pre-Civil War vintage”7 and,
concomitantly, by not fully appreciating that it was best to defer to
Congress’ explicit (and expanded) power to enact anti-discrimination
law under Section 5. By assuming for itself the sole power to define the
scope of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court took a
document “that seemed, on its face, to expand federal legislative power”
and transformed it into a “vehicle for the expansion of federal judicial
power.”8 For Chief Justice Warren, this propensity was disturbing in
light of the Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson9 and its increasing
willingness, in a lassiez-faire economic climate at the turn of the
twentieth century, to employ the Due Process Clause as a means to
enforce property (instead of human) rights.10 Consequently, in refusing
to give Congress “a meaningful role in Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement,”11 the Court displayed that it was not institutionally
2. Id. Justice Brennan’s line is drawn in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
Critics assert it is inconsistent to allow Congress the power to expand, but not retard, rights. See
Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 81 (1969).
3. Earl Warren, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 212-33 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1970).
4. Id.
5. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
6. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
7. Warren, supra note 3, at 220.
8. Id. at 222.
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. Warren, supra note 3, at 224.
11. Id. at 225.
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competent to resolve the social problem of Negro equality that, in turn,
destroyed its “essential function . . . to act as the final arbiter of minority
rights.”12
The Brennan and Warren viewpoints illustrate that even the most
ideologically compatible jurists can agree on the objective while still
expressing different conclusions about whether it is likely to be
achieved. While Brennan optimistically saw the Fourteenth Amendment
as the means to effectuate positive social change in the benevolent hands
of the Supreme Court, Warren was more circumspect and doubtful in
light of the Court’s historic failure to do so. Hence, unlike Brennan,
Warren was more willing to surrender judicial authority to Congress and
share enforcement duties if it meant that the nation could move forward
and “translat[e] the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equality into
meaningful action.”13 With cases like United States v. Guest,14 South
Carolina v. Katzenbach,15 and Katzenbach v. Morgan,16 Warren took
some solace (in 1968) that the Court might be moving away from the
interpretative constraints that cases like The Civil Rights Cases17
imposed.18 Yet, he wondered aloud if it was realistic to think that the
Court would be able to show the kind of moral leadership that would
continue to break down the racial barriers that transformed America into
anation that is “moving toward ‘two societies, one black, one white –
separate and unequal.’”19
Perhaps Warren’s remarks were tempered by a pragmatic
inevitability (if not a little foresight) that the Court’s Section 5
jurisprudence would surely change for the worse if more restraintoriented justices were appointed to the bench. Given its dubious track
record in affording Congress the legislative power under Section 5 to
enforce the Amendment, he might have also intuited that the Court
would be reluctant to loosen the state-action requirement in an effort to
broaden the scope of Section 1 guarantees to encompass private conduct
in prospective non-racial discrimination cases. In spite of what Warren
may have believed, and even though he and Brennan might have differed
on whether the Court might be the instrument for salutary change in
12. Id. at 228.
13. Id. at 227.
14. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
15. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
16. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
17. 109 U.S. 3 (1866).
18. Warren, supra note 3, at 226-27.
19. Warren, supra note 3, at 228-29; id. at 213 (quoting from Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders 1 (1968)).
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equal protection law, both Justices nonetheless recognized that the
substantive contours of the Amendment are shaped by the proper use of
judicial power which, in the end, reflected the willingness of the Court to
defer to Congress’ initiatives in enacting legislation that furthered the
value of equality. Stated differently, the constitutional politics of
interpreting Section 5 is, in essence, a debate about the scope of judicial
supremacy. As a result, all the rights expressed in Section 1 of the
Amendment often hang in the precarious balance of those who hold, and
aggressively assert, institutional power in the pursuit of ideological goals
at a particular time in the Court’s history.
In this way the Rehnquist Court’s approach to Section 5
jurisprudence is identical to the one utilized by Justices Brennan and
Warren in an earlier day when they, instead of conservatives, controlled
the ideological outcomes of the Court. While the contemporary Court is
continuing to restrict Congress’ power through its construction of what
the Fourteenth Amendment (and federalism) means, the noninterpretivist judicial philosophy that defined the Warren Court’s legacy
historically and expanded Congress’ authority was justified—and
politically legitimized—by what the Court said Congress could do in a
political system of separated powers and compound federalism. What is
different is who is sitting on the bench, and who holds the power to
make such declarations in law.
Accordingly, the politics of
constitutional interpretation are indeed profound, but typically center on
a very old debate about state sovereignty that remains remarkably
resilient in the face of ever-changing political, legal and social milieus.
What may be distinct is the Rehnquist Court’s adamant insistence that it
has the exclusive obligation to be the final arbiter of federalism, a
behavior pattern that transforms it into an illegitimate body of judicial
fiat, rather than a defensible court of justice.20 The Court’s self-imposed
claim to be authoritative in matters of social policy has manifested itself
in other areas of jurisprudence that also serve as an expression in the law
of federalism.21 What is striking about the Court’s line-drawing, though,
20. See Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the
Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 148-49 (2000). The authors
analyze the Court’s work in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and conclude not only
that the Court misapplied precedent, but also that they are “unaware of any other instance in which a
court has gone to such lengths to derive controlling meaning from the presumed, yet unspoken,
premises of century-old precedent.” Id. at 149.
21. The Rehnquist Court’s micro-management of campaign and election law is an example
that some have claimed not only illegitimately determined the 2000 presidential election, but also
underscores the tendency for the Court to stake its institutional claim to be final arbiter in the
political thicket. See generally THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R.
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is the length it will go to protect its domain while, simultaneously,
running blindly into a host of historical, doctrinal, and institutional
contradictions that call into question the soundness of its constitutional
wisdom in Section 5 cases.
This essay analyzes the Rehnquist Court’s Section 5 cases by first,
in Section I, establishing how the Supreme Court has historically
assumed the task of interpreting Congress’ power to act under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Two periods, Reconstruction and then the mid1960s, are examined because they present contrasting views about the
scope of what the Fourteenth Amendment and its enforcement section
means. Section II then surveys Section 5 cases from the Rehnquist
Court in order to illustrate how its jurisprudence mirrors the antifederalist rhetoric established in the post-reconstruction era while, not
surprisingly, departing from the principles set forth in the Warren
Court’s egalitarian revolution. Section III analyzes the Rehnquist
Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence while predicting how the Court is likely
to approach deciding Hibbs v. Department of Human Resources,22 a
Ninth Circuit case the Court agreed to decide in the 2002-03 Term. It
also concludes that the Court, in Hibbs, is likely to apply an
interpretivist construction of Section 5 power that will reaffirm the antifederalist doctrine established in the Reconstruction period and, as a
result, reassert judicial supremacy, while missing another opportunity to
align constitutional law doctrine with the framer’s more salutary design
in creating the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly gives Congress
the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the Amendment’s
provisions.23 Under Section 1, the provisions are directed at prohibiting
state action and guaranteeing rights of privileges or immunities, due
process, and equal protection. As Section 1 rights are stated in broad
terms, Section 5 empowers Congress to make national laws affecting a
vast range of state conduct and individual liberty.24 Accordingly, the
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Christopher P. Banks & John C. Green, Introduction, in
SUPERINTENDING DEMOCRACY: THE COURTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS (Christopher P. Banks
& John C. Green, eds., 2001); Christopher P. Banks, A December Storm Over the Supreme Court:
Bush v. Gore and Superintending Democracy, in SUPERINTENDING DEMOCRACY: THE COURTS AND
THE POLITICAL PROCESS, supra, at 237-64.
22. 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Supreme Court has confronted the challenge of resolving two
fundamental Section 5 issues. First, can Congress use Section 5
authority to apply the rights’ guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
to non-state (i.e. private) actors? Second, can Congress employ Section
5 power to alter the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive meaning in
Section 1 by passing laws that change (or define initially) what the
Supreme Court has said (or not said) about what the rights are? 25 Both
questions directly address core separation of powers and federalism
values because each fundamentally concern whether the Fourteenth
Amendment is a grant of constitutional authority that Congress can
employ to displace the states’ pre-Civil War role in determining, or
safeguarding, individual civil liberties.26 While the Court has given
different responses to each question during its political history, the
Rehnquist Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence has brought into sharp relief a
third question that is a derivative of the answers it has given to the first
two: namely, to what extent can the Eleventh Amendment limit
Congress’ power to fashion a legislative remedy that preserves civil
rights and liberties pursuant to its Section 5 power? With this issue the
Rehnquist Court has underscored the anti-civil rights’ significance of its
federalism doctrine.
Its approach highlights the difficulties in
contemplating that Section 5 is both a source of rights (under Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment) and an independent justification to gain
access to federal courts whenever the states compromise liberty.27 Often
25. See generally GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
917-1021 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 13th ed. 1997).
26. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War
and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 871-74 (1986); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy
History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1323-24 (1952).
27. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See Symposium, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints
on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001). In this sense, Section 5 is different, and
perhaps more important to the civil rights struggle, because it provides not only support for
congressional action under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also legitimizes the
litigation decision to sue a state in federal court in situations where state sovereignty immunity can
be abrogated under the Eleventh Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The
Rehnquist Court’s Section 5 decisions premise the outcome of Eleventh Amendment and Section 1
and Section 5 (of the Fourteenth Amendment) cases on anti-federalist legal principles that, more
often than not, assume priority over competing pro-nationalist doctrine. As the Court has held, in
Fitzpatrick, Section 5 is an independent source of national power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
state sovereignty; but, by putting the sovereign interests above all else (most of the time) and
making it virtually impossible for the Congress to meet its judicially-imposed burden to tightly fit
its legislative ends with its legislative means, the Court is emasculating Congress’s power under
Section 5 to either protect against state or private abuse of civil rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the Court is nullifying, on federalism grounds,
any meaningful attempt to effectuate civil rights through Section 5, and in the process, tilting the
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the Rehnquist Court has looked to key precedents decided in the Chase
(1864-73), Waite (1874-88) and Fuller (1888-1910) period, a time when
anti-federalist sentiment, and racial tension ran high in the wake of the
Civil War.28 After these cases are examined, select rulings from the
Warren Court are compared with them to discern the outer limits of a
liberal construction of Section 5 powers. It is against this background
that the Section 5 cases come full circle in the Rehnquist Court.
A. Early Interpretations
The Court’s first significant opportunity to explore the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment occurred during the Chase Court with The
Slaughterhouse Cases.29 This case set the tone for subsequent
interpretations of not only Section 1, but also Section 5. There, the
Court refused to recognize that individual butchers have a right to labor
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, a guaranty that the butchers
thought was jeopardized by a state law permitting the monopolization of
slaughterhouses (purportedly as a public safety measure that controlled
animal carcass disposal). In holding that the clause only pertains to
United States citizens and not state governments, Justice Samuel F.
Miller reasoned that the states were the sole province for protecting state
citizens’ labor rights.30 The federal Constitution, therefore, only applied
to privileges or immunities of a national character, such as the right to
petition the government, the right of assembly or the right of habeas
corpus. Only a few defined rights, the Court rationalized, originated
from the relationship between the national government and the citizen
(and, inferentially, apart from Slaughterhouse, inhumane treatment of
blacks by whites in the states was not one of them).31 Recognizing a
balance of power in favor of the states too much. In essence the Court is refusing to acknowledge
Congress’s special competence to make legislative judgments on policy issues, as well as
eliminating, for litigants suffering civil rights abuse, the possibility that national courts can entertain
Congress’s legislative effort to provide legal remedies. As a result, in not respecting Section 5 as an
independent source of legislative discretion (and authority) under either the Fourteenth or Eleventh
Amendments, the Court is assuming for itself absolute control over social policy in the antidiscrimination and civil rights context. See Estreicher, supra note 20, at 156-57.
28. See generally ABRAHAM L. DAVIS & BARBARA LUCK GRAHAM, THE SUPREME COURT,
RACE AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1-56 (1995).
29. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
30. Id. at 71.
31. Id. at 79. As Nelson comments, Justice Miller’s holding “for narrowing the reach of
section one were flatly inconsistent with the history of its framing in Congress and its ratification by
the state legislatures.” WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLES TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 163 (1988); See also Gressman, supra note 26, at 1323-58,
1338.
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different outcome, Miller suggested, wrongly allows Congress to usurp
the states’ ability to safeguard rights and transforms the Court into a
“perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of
their own citizens.”32 Not only would this error “fetter and degrade the
State governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress,” it
“radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and
Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the
people.”33
Although black civil rights were not directly at issue,
Slaughterhouse’s anti-federalist rhetoric reinforced state power at a time
when the national legislature was trying, through sundry Civil Rights
and Enforcement Acts, to improve the political and legal status of
blacks.34 The formal distinction between national and state citizenship
did little to advance their rights, for it effectively read the Privileges and
Immunities Clause out of the Constitution.35
Moreover, while
Slaughterhouse did not address the scope of Section 5 power (but only
the constitutionality of state law), the result signaled that the Court was
not going to be receptive to ratifying Congress’ enforcement legislation
if it expanded the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning. The message was
emphatic, but paradoxical: state governments were in charge of
safeguarding Negro civil rights, even though they were also responsible
for enacting the infamous black codes that took them away. There
seems little doubt that by constricting the meaning of the Fourteenth
32. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 78.
33. Id.
34. The legislative response to the Civil War Amendments included The Civil Rights Act of
1866, 14 Stat. L. 27, the first Enforcement Act (May 31, 1870), 16 Stat. L. 140, the second
Enforcement Act (February 28, 1871), 16 Stat. L. 433, and the third Enforcement Act (or Ku Klux
Klan Act) (April 20, 1871), 17 Stat. L. 13. DAVIS, supra note 28, at 12-13. The 1866 Civil Rights
Act, passed over President Andrew Johnson’s veto, was inspired by the Thirteenth Amendment, and
it aimed to undo the restrictions imposed by the black codes by granting blacks the same kind of
rights (to make contracts, be sued, etc.) that whites had. It also prescribed criminal penalties against
anyone acting under “color of law” who denied them. Id. The first Enforcement Act’s object was
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment; the second Act levied criminal penalties against those
interfering with black rights in exercising the franchise; and the third Act was aimed at curbing
private conspiracies that often, with the use of violence, curtailed black civil rights. Id. Gressman,
supra note 26, at 1323-26.
35. As Gressman puts it:
The decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases has never been reversed. The Fourteenth
Amendment to this day has never recovered its life blood which the Court there
extracted from it. Completely shattered was the privileges and immunities clause upon
which rested the intricate pattern of nationally protected civil rights. . . . For all practical
purposes the privileges and immunities clause passed into the realm of historical
oddities.
Id. at 1338.
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Amendment, the Court (unwittingly or not) was aligning itself with the
forces of racial bigotry and hatred. Indeed, in several cases after
Slaughterhouse the Court undercut Congress’ attempt to counter racial
discrimination and make the Fourteenth Amendment a source of hope,
instead of despair, for the emancipated race.36
Two cases decided in the Waite Court, Ex Parte Virginia37 and The
Civil Rights Cases,38 are illustrative of this tendency, even though they
might have otherwise been significant opportunities to make Section 5
congruent with the salutary intent of at least one congressional effort, the
1875 Civil Rights Act. In Ex Parte Virginia the Court ruled that a state
judge who excluded blacks from jury service could be criminally
indicted under the Act.39 Over the strenuous dissent of Justice Stephen
Field, Justice William Strong’s opinion for the Court asserted that a
“great purpose” of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was to
achieve a “perfect equality of civil rights” among all persons in the
states.40 The enforcement clause gave the Amendments “much of their
force” because it “enlarged” Congress’ power to enact appropriate
legislation that made “the Amendments fully effective.”41 Furthermore,
Strong declared that “[s]uch enforcement is no invasion of State
sovereignty,” reasoning that Congress was acting pursuant to its
delegated authority; thus a state “in exercising her rights . . . cannot
disregard the limitations which the Federal Constitution has applied to
her power.”42 His dissenting brethren, Justice Field, thought otherwise,
36. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (refusing to recognize the legal
validity of criminal indictments against three whites who conspired, with about 100 other whites, to
deny blacks their voting rights at a political gathering pursuant to Section 6 of the 1870
Enforcement Act); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating the 1871 Ku Klux
Klan Act which sought to protect against private conspiracies to deny blacks civil rights); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that Congress is without power under the Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the 1875 Civil Rights Act, which guaranteed equal public
accommodations and provided, in the case of violations, criminal sanctions). See Gressman, supra
note 26, at 1336-43; DAVIS, supra note 28, at 1-56.
37. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
38. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
39. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 349.
40. Id. at 344-45. See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (finding the
Fourteenth Amendment secures civil rights to all persons).
41. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345. Justice Strong explained what is “appropriate”
legislation by remarking that “[w]hatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the
objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the
domain of congressional power.” Id. at 345-46.
42. Id. at 346. As Justice Strong explained, “[i]ndeed, every addition of power to the general
government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is
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contending that the national law controlled a state judge’s discretion to
select, in accordance with state law, qualified veniremen.43 For Field,
such meddling curtailed a state’s “absolute freedom from all external
interference in the exercise of its legislative, judicial and executive
authority.”44
Whereas Justice Strong’s opinion in Virginia had the potential to
offer some comfort for those endorsing a liberal construction of Section
5 powers, its holding, on the surface,45 was more of the exception than
the rule.46 The Supreme Court, in fact, more typically drew a line that is
consistent with Justice Field’s view in The Civil Rights Cases,47 an
outcome invalidating the 1875 Act’s public accommodations provisions.
In nullifying Congress’ power to create an anti-discrimination law based
on either Section 1 or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Joseph P.
Bradley’s majority opinion observed that the 1875 Act directly, and
generally, regulated individual conduct, without reference to any state
law on the subject. The Fourteenth Amendment, Bradley declared,
applies only to “State action of a particular character . . . [and] individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the
amendment.”48 Section 5, he continued, only authorizes Congress “[t]o
adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited
State laws and State acts.”49 While Congress may, on occasion, enact a
law that “in advance . . . meet[s] the exigency when it arises,” the law
nonetheless “should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the
amendment was intended to provide against; and that is, State laws, or

carved out of them.” Id.
43. Id. at 354 (Field, J., dissenting) (asserting the Constitution does not give Congress the
power to regulate officers of the state who discharge state laws).
44. Id. at 362.
45. Instead of interpreting Ex Parte Virginia as a case that expanded the Fourteenth
Amendment’s meaning, Nelson states that the Court construed the state judge’s acts during jury
selection as being ministerial (instead of judicial), thereby helping to create a doctrine of judicial
immunity and “hence . . . a weakening of the Fourteenth Amendment” because, inferentially, a
flagrantly racial, and state-sanctioned, “judicial” act would not fall under the protection of the
Amendment. NELSON, supra note 31, at 184.
46. In addition to Ex Parte Virginia, the Waite Court made at least two other rulings
vindicating Congress’s anti-discriminatory power and black civil rights in Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that denying blacks jury service was an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection), and Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (reaffirming Strauder).
DAVIS, supra note 28, at 18-19. But, with Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), which held that
juries did not have to be racially integrated in accordance with equal protection, the Court
diminished the legal force of the principles outlined in Ex Parte Virginia, Strauder, and Neal. Id.
47. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id.
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State action of some kind, adverse to the rights of the citizen secured by
the amendment.”50 Bradley’s analysis, which is roughly the application
of a means/end test, prefers to ratify what the national government does
only as a direct response to a pre-existing pattern of state conduct that
necessitates application of the rights-protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.51
These principles are the basis for the state action concept and
remain at the cornerstone of subsequent Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence that inhibits it from pertaining to private behavior.52 Yet
Bradley’s opinion was significant for Section 5 cases in other ways. For
example, it illustrated that the Court would take the analytical step of
determining the scope of Congress’ Section 5 power by inspecting the
national legislation carefully to see if makes reference to, and is
designed to prevent or fix, constitutional violations by the state. By
placing the onus on Congress to write a law that responds to specific
state law violations, the Court is engaging in a rudimentary form of
“plain statement” analysis, a principle that has long been a characteristic
of restrictive Section 5 cases.53 Also, in rejecting the notion that the
1875 Act might be considered corrective legislation, Bradley identified
“corrective” laws as what “may be necessary and proper for
counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which,
by the [Fourteenth] amendment, they are prohibited from making or
enforcing.”54 Notably, although Bradley limited national authority, his
choice to use the words “necessary and proper” are susceptible to a
contrary interpretation, and one that is more consistent with the way they
were used by subsequent Courts to increase legislative power, even in
the Section 5 context.55 Finally, it discloses that Congress’ decision to
enact “general” legislation (i.e. legislation that does not remedy specific
state law deprivations) will run afoul of the Tenth Amendment because
it displaces a state’s right to legislate on the same subject (i.e. say,
passing an anti-discrimination law).56 Perceiving the Tenth Amendment
50. Id. at 13.
51. See generally Symposium, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469 (1999).
52. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, infra note 181; United States v. Morrison, infra note
215. See also GUNTHER, supra note 25, at 925-26.
53. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). See generally DAVID M. O’BRIEN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: STRUGGLES FOR POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 665-73 (5th ed. 2003).
54. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13-14.
55. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316 (1819).
56. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14-15.
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as an affirmative limitation on what the national government can do, of
course, is also a precursor to the argument Associate Justice Rehnquist
made several generations later in National League of Cities v. Usery.57
The majority position in Slaughterhouse was contested by Justice
John Marshall Harlan I, who registered a lengthy dissent that mirrors
many of the objections that would persist, over time, about the limited
scope of congressional power. While Justice Harlan had not yet penned
his famous Plessy v. Ferguson58 dissent, he struck an identical chord in
Civil Rights. The majority erred, he began, because “the substance and
spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed
by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism.”59 Harlan continued:
“It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes the
law: the letter of the law is the body; the sense and reason of the law is
the soul.” Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty,
and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if need
be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American
citizenship, have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people
desired to accomplish, which they attempted to accomplish, and which
they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental
law. By this I do not mean that the determination of these cases should
have been materially controlled by considerations of mere expediency
or policy. I mean only, in this form, to express an earnest conviction
that the court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the
interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to
the intent with which they were adopted.60

For Harlan, the Court ought to recognize that the law’s intent is to
prevent racial discrimination, and to say that Congress had no power to
prevent it is incompatible with prior cases, like Prigg v. Pennsylvania,61
which upheld the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 as a constitutional
exercise of Congress’ implied power to permit the re-capture of fugitive
slaves and preserve the master’s property rights under Article IV,
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.62 How can it be, Harlan asked, that
Congress has the implied right to recapture fugitive slaves but not the
57. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), rev’d by, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
58. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
59. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
62. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 27-30. Justice Harlan added that the Court found that
Congress had “the implied power . . . to enforce the master’s rights” under the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 as well. Id. at 30.
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express authority, under the Thirteenth Amendment (and its enforcement
clause, in Section 2), to safeguard “freedom and the rights necessarily
inhering in a state of freedom[?]”63
Harlan’s answer was unequivocal. It is absurd, he wrote, to
eliminate the institution of slavery and then enslave the blacks again by
leaving them in the care of the states, the source of their initial bondage.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited such an anomaly, and its
commitment to end slavery and all of “its badges and incidents” is at
“the foundation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”64 Because the Act
does not prescribe the method by which individuals or businesses
operate railroads, inns, or places of public amusement, the legislation
also did not impermissibly tread on state power or sovereignty. 65 Nor
was it conceivable that Congress could not use its constitutional
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent, through proactive
legislation, “hostile State laws or hostile State proceedings.”66 If
anything, Harlan suggested, Section 5 enlarged Congress’ power by
denying to states the right to engage in racial discrimination; but it did
not (as the majority maintained) concomitantly increase judicial
authority since the Court can always nullify unconstitutional state action,
regardless of whether Section 5 existed or not.67 As Harlan put it:
It is . . . a grave misconception to suppose that the fifth section of the
amendment has reference exclusively to express prohibitions upon
State laws or State action. If any right was created by that amendment,
the grant of power, through appropriate legislation, to enforce its
provisions, authorizes Congress, by means of legislation, operation
throughout the entire Union, to guard, secure and protect that right.68

For Harlan, then, the Court must use restraint in upsetting
Congress’ legislative judgment, for “it is for Congress, [and] not the
judiciary, to say that legislation is appropriate—that is—best adapted to
the end to be attained.”69 Acting contrary to this (properly applied)
63. Id. at 34.
64. Id. at 35.
65. Id. at 41-43. Harlan also observed that, in Prigg, the Court specifically “turned a deaf
ear” to the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s argument that validating national power would be a
“dangerous encroachment on state sovereignty.” The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 30.
66. Id. at 44-45.
67. Id. at 45-46.
68. Id. at 46-47.
69. Id. at 51. As he explained:
The judiciary may not, with safety to our institutions, enter the domain of legislative
discretion, and dictate the means which Congress shall employ in the exercise of its
granted powers. That would be sheer usurpation of the functions of a co-ordinate
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means/ends test, Harlan suggested, violates extant principles established
in McCulloch v. Maryland,70 and it wrongfully denies to Congress the
power to give blacks privileges or immunities (under Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment) that the states are trying to take away.71
The judicial conflict in the Slaughterhouse and Civil Rights cases
cannot mask the general trend of the Court’s anti-civil rights’
jurisprudence in the post-Reconstruction period. Although the Court
vindicated the rights of blacks in isolated instances, by and large the
judicial branch, either through decision, indifference, or inconsistency,
was far from being a champion of minority interests.72 Indeed, it was the
champion of state interests, a fact that eerily presaged Justice John Paul
Stevens’s evaluation of the Rehnquist Court nearly 125 years later.73
Consequently, in the formative years after the Civil War, and lasting
until (roughly) 1938, the Fourteenth Amendment was more akin to being
an empty promise for those wishing that it would be an instrument for
ending racial discrimination.74 Congress’ capability to use Section 5 was
even less, as the Supreme Court indicated that it was not going to use its
judicial power to ratify a liberal view of the Amendment, which in turn
minimizes what the legislative branch could do in equalizing racial
relations. The Court was not receptive to applying Section 1 rights’
guarantees to private conduct. Nor, would it generally expand the
Amendment’s substantive content. In light of this track record, it is
unremarkable that Chief Justice Warren, in 1969, had a dim view of the
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment cases after the Civil War.75
B. The Outer Limits of Section 5 Authority
In the Slaughterhouse cases to the Civil Rights Cases,76 and with
department, which, if often repeated, and permanently acquiesced in, would work a
radical change in our system of government.
Id.
70. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
71. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 51-52.
72. See generally Gressman, supra note 26.
73. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. C. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 664
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the Court as “the champion of States’ rights”).
74. Abraham L. Davis and Barbara Luck Graham aver that the Court’s opinions during this
period “proved to be [the] blacks’ worst enemy.” DAVIS, supra note 28, at 60. They also assert that
the Court, incrementally, expanded the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly after 1935,
and in light of the Court’s famous “Footnote Four” ruling in United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144 (1938), which signaled a more activist approach in crafting equality principles. Id. at
75-79.
75. Warren, supra note 3, at 212-33.
76. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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the 1877 Tilden/Hayes Compromise77 and, later, Plessy v. Ferguson,78
the Supreme Court endorsed a pre-Civil War, or anti-federalist
conception of federalism.79 That understanding envisioned the national
government and states as co-equal sovereigns. As such, the former could
only act properly pursuant to its carefully prescribed delegated authority,
so unsubstantiated forays into the sacrosanct sphere of the states was not
going to be legitimated by the Supreme Court. The states were the true
and traditional defenders of civil liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment
was a source for rights’ protection only if either state action was
implicated, or a fundamental right derived from national citizenship was
compromised. The Court’s role was passive, as it would not align itself
with congressional efforts to equalize relations between the races, at
least through expansive interpretations of either Section 1 or 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it would only actively protect the states
in those instances when the national government threatened the states’
co-equal status in a balanced political system of shared power. In the
spirit of the times, unless private property or business interests were
compromised, it would not exercise its discretion to be a proactive
champion of individual civil rights, in spite of the broad potential of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the intent of its framers.80
A number of historical and political developments, including most
notably the centralization of the national government brought on by the
New Deal, facilitated a doctrinal shift in Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, culminating in the “switch in time that saved nine”
rulings,81 and shortly thereafter the decision in United States v. Carolene
77. Scholars observe that the Court’s participation in the Compromise (especially with Justice
Bradley casting the deciding vote in favor of candidate Rutherford B. Hayes) brought an abrupt end
to Reconstruction (with a pledge to withdraw national troops and a promise not to use force in the
attainment of civil rights) and “reaffirm[ed]” white supremacy, states’ rights, and southern racism.
Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of Constitutional Error: The Rehnquist Court’s States’ Rights
Assault on Fourteenth Amendment Protections of Individual Rights, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
259, 365-67 (2001). See also DAVIS, supra note 28, at 13.
78. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding “separate but equal” facilities are
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment).
79. See Warren, supra note 3, at 220.
80. Law professor (and now Dean) Richard Aynes’ account of John Bingham’s role in
drafting the Fourteenth Amendment discloses that Bingham harbored a complex constitutional
theory that supported an expansive view of national power to protect civil rights. Richard L. Aynes,
On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 66-74 (1993); see
also HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM & THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS &
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (6th ed. 1994) (observing that the Court, from 1836 to 1930,
was inclined to protect state authority and, increasingly, “the sanctity of property”).
81. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage
protection law); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National
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Products and its famous Footnote Four.82 In time, the rise of the
administrative state, when combined with the judiciary’s increased
enforcement of civil rights and liberties under the so-called “double
standard”83 of the Fourteenth Amendment, restructured the relationship
between the national and state governments and, for the second time in
history,84 tilted the balance of power towards the former instead of the
latter. The states, which were now subject to a judicially-created
doctrine of selective incorporation that inexorably nationalized most of
the Bill of Rights, increasingly were faced with the political reality that
the federal Constitution generally, and the Fourteenth Amendment
specifically, was a substantial source of civil liberty.85 These
transformations greatly helped politically disadvantaged and minority
interests because the Supreme Court began to use the Fourteenth
Amendment as more of a sword instead of a shield against recalcitrant
states that denied civil rights and liberties, particularly in the area of
voting rights, criminal justice, public accommodations and higher
education.86
The second era of national expansion coincided, in part, with the
Warren Court (1953-69) and its respective due process and egalitarian
revolutions.87 In arguably its most important civil rights ruling, Brown
v. Board of Education88 the Court not only rejected the doctrinal premise
of Plessy’s “separate but equal doctrine,” but also sought to go “where
no court had ever gone before [and] dismantle an entrenched social

Labor Relations Act of 1935). These rulings signaled that the Court would uphold, instead of reject,
legislative power (and, on a national level, the New Deal) and a posture that only a few years earlier
looked quite improbable. ABRAHAM, supra note 80, at 10-11.
82. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The three paragraphs of Footnote 4 signal, inter alia, that a
law conflicting with the Bill of Rights is presumptively unconstitutional, as well as, greater judicial
scrutiny in evaluating legislation that undermines civil rights and the interests of “discrete and
insular” minorities. Id. See also ABRAHAM, supra note 80, at 17-22; DAVIS, supra note 28, at 77.
83. ABRAHAM, supra note 80, at 9-29.
84. The first time was during the Marshall Court, where the Supreme Court was interested in
expanding Congress’s legislative power over commerce. See id. at 9.
85. Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s Opinion for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937), is often credited with constitutionalizing the “preferred freedoms” doctrine, or “concept of
ordered liberty,” that reflected the Court’s commitment to incorporate, selectively, specific
provisions of the national Bill of Rights under due process clause for the purpose of applying them
against the action of state governments. Prior to Palko, the Court, in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.
243 (1833), refused to do so, leaving wharf owner Barron without a federal remedy under the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment in his lawsuit for damages against the City of Baltimore for
dredging Baltimore’s harbor and ruining access to Barron’s wharf.
86. DAVIS, supra note 28, at 60, 75-77. See generally id. at 57-114.
87. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).
88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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order.”89 Ironically, the cultural attitude under more rigorous judicial
scrutiny was the byproduct of the anti-federalist mindset that the Court
itself helped to ratify, in spite of the Union victory in the Civil War: that
racial segregation was a local issue that was (perhaps) morally justified
but, in any event, must be handled by the states without national
interference.90 Until Brown, the Supreme Court, by and large, showed
little inclination to rebut the cultural presumption of white supremacy.
But, with Brown and its second “all deliberate speed” enforcement
decision91 along with Cooper v. Aaron,92 the Court was now poised to
wield its own moral authority, and judicial power, to implement Brown’s
racial integration mandate.93
Although some in the legal academy downplay the Court’s role in
the civil rights struggle in the 1950s and 1960s,94 it is not happenstance
that the political branches stepped up their fight against racial
discrimination and Southern resistance to Brown with a bevy of statutes
and executive action geared toward enfranchising blacks and breaking
down the barriers of state-sanctioned legal segregation.95 Undoubtedly
the country became more sympathetic to the victims of racial bigotry
after witnessing the violent reaction of government officials in
Birmingham, Alabama and, later, Selma, Mississippi, that forcibly
resisted integration in the early 1960s.96 Still, the Civil Rights Act of
89. POWE, supra note 87, at 27.
90. Id. at 34.
91. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (holding that implementation of Brown
I should proceed “with all deliberate speed”).
92. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
93. The Court, however, occasionally took the lead in attacking racial segregation. See, e.g.,
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating grandfather clauses that restrict black
voting rights). The Roosevelt Administration created a Civil Liberties Unit in the Department of
Justice in 1939, and then later helped launch a Committee on Fair Employment Practices to
superintend business practices with the national government. President Harry Truman also took
executive action against racism ordering, inter alia, that the military must be integrated. O’BRIEN,
supra note 53, at 1322-23.
94. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 336-43 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991).
95. See the policy decisions by the Kennedy, and subsequently the Johnson, Administrations
to make civil rights enforcement a priority in the aftermath of Brown. O’BRIEN, supra note 53, at
1324-25.
96. POWE, supra note 87, at 223-25 (recounting Martin Luther King’s successful, but
controversial, decision to enlist children in the civil rights’ protests in Birmingham, one that allowed
public opinion to change in favor of the protesters after children were seen being pelted with high
pressure fire hoses); id. at 225-26 (describing the assassination of Medgar Evers, an NAACP
organizer, in Jackson, Mississippi, at the end of a ten-week period of civil rights protests in 186
cities, with nearly 15,000 arrests); id. at 232-33 (describing the outrage, and rioting, following a
bombing of a Baptist Church in Birmingham that killed and injured several children, which served
as a partial impetus for the 1964 Civil Rights Act). In speaking about Brown’s effect and the Civil
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1964 (at first, reluctantly) proposed by the Kennedy Administration
languished in Congress until John F. Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas
in November, 1963.97 Shortly thereafter, his successor, President Lyndon
Baines Johnson, and ultimately Congress, ushered it into law in
February, 1964, and the landmark legislation was soon to be followed by
the path-breaking Voting Rights Act of 1965.98
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 had the combined effect of equalizing public accommodations and
enfranchising, each law was immediately challenged. The Warren Court
responded in kind with landmark cases that reinterpreted the scope of
Congress’ power to enforce civil and voting rights legislation under the
Civil War Amendments. The first, an eight-to-one ruling in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach penned by the Chief Justice,99 reinvigorated the
enforcement clause (Section 2) of the Fifteenth Amendment and
rebuffed South Carolina’s claim that the Voting Rights Act improperly
barred the state from using certain voting qualifications (e.g. literacy
tests) as prerequisites for exercising the franchise. After surveying the
prior, but invariably futile, legislative and executive efforts to stop the
“widespread ‘pattern or practice’”100 of voting discrimination in select
southern states, Warren reiterated the legal rule that Congress is
empowered to “use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”101 Congress, which is
“chiefly responsible for implementing the prohibitions by appropriate
legislation,” had plenary power under Section 2 and McCulloch v.
Maryland to devise specific remedies for achieving its legislative
ends.102 The legislature, moreover, extensively studied the problem and
Rights Act’s passage, Powe states that “[t]he entire weight of the federal government was available
to make equal opportunities a reality.” Id. at 234.
97. The 1964 Civil Rights Act is based on Congress’ commerce authority instead of Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its main provisions (Title II) outlawed discrimination in public
accommodations supported by State action, but it also loosened or ended some state restrictions
(like literacy tests) on voting. The voting rights component was a forerunner of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. DAVIS, supra note 28, at 132-33, 149-51. The Civil Rights Act also barred
employment discrimination in Title VII. O’BRIEN, supra note 53, at 1325.
98. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, which is based on Congress’s power in Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment to end racial inequality, is a comprehensive, remedial statute aimed at
eliminating voting qualifications based on race, and it gives the U.S. Attorney General a preemptive
role in monitoring voting discrimination practices through “preclearance” of state changes to
election laws. O’BRIEN, supra note 53, at 773-74; DAVIS, supra note 28, at 132-33.
99. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
100. Id. at 312.
101. Id. at 324.
102. Id. at 326. There, Warren stated that Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, “[l]et the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
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engaged in lengthy deliberations in considering what the best solution
was to what Warren called an “insidious and pervasive evil” that was
“perpetuated in certain parts of [the] country through unremitting and
ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”103 Nothing Congress did in the
Voting Rights Act, Warren thus observed, encroached on the states’
reserved powers, nor insulated them from federal judicial review,
because state power cannot be “used as an instrument for circumventing
a federally protected right.”104
While the Supreme Court acknowledged Congress had reacted to
correcting a pre-existing discrimination problem in the states, South
Carolina’s significance rests with the inference that the judiciary would
sanction Congress’ use of Section 2 enforcement power in future,
undefined areas of social policy.105 Clearly, with its references to
McCulloch and its invocation of rational basis as the guiding principles
of the outcome, Warren’s opinion indicated that the Court would be
more of a rubber stamp instead of an axe in cases where the exercise of
national power was challenged by the states. What remained to be seen
was how far the Court was willing to go in deferring to congressional
will and, concomitantly, whether the evolving expansion of
congressional enforcement power could withstand the test of time and
political change.
Together, with other Warren Court rulings demonstrating the
breadth of Congress’ commerce and law enforcement authority to hold
that state and private individuals are civilly and criminally accountable
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but [consistent] with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.” Id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).
Warren used this principle to equate it to Section 2 power by saying that “[t]he basic test to be
applied in a case involving [Section] 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases
concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the States.” Id.
Significantly, in the next sentence, he said that the Court has “subsequently echoed [Marshall’s
language in McCulloch] in describing each of the Civil War Amendments.” South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966) (emphasis added). Presumably, then, Congress’ authority in
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as when it exercises power in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as in Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. At one time,
apparently this was the case. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
103. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. Warren noted that the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held hearings over nine days; and floor discussion in both chambers spanned nearly one
full month. Id.
104. Id. at 325 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)).
105. Theodore Eisenberg observes, for example, that South Carolina “established Congress’s
power to proscribe a class of suspect practices without finding that in every instance the practices
would be held by the judiciary to be unconstitutional.” Theodore Eisenberg, South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 291 (Kermit
L. Hall ed., 1999).
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for racially motivated behavior,106 Katzenbach v. Morgan107 represents
the outer limits of enforcement power doctrine. Morgan held, seven-totwo, that a national law (Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965)
removing literacy barriers for voting is a valid exercise of legislative
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in spite of a
contrary law from New York making the ability to read and write
English a prerequisite for casting a ballot. In reversing the district
court’s ruling that held Section 4(e) impinged upon states’ power under
the Tenth Amendment, Justice William Brennan’s majority opinion
asserted that Section 5 permitted Congress to pass the Voting Rights
legislation and that Article VI, the Supremacy Clause, nullified a
contrary state election law.108 It also dismissed, with a number of
historical references, the contention that Congress’ Section 5 power is
limited to enforcing laws that come within the ambit of what courts have
already determined to be unconstitutional.109 Such an interpretation, he
wrote, would “depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and
congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment.”110 It
would also be contrary to the framer’s intent, which was to make Section
5 a powerful grant of delegated power that was in line with the
McCulloch principle and, of course, the spirit of the Constitution.111
Hence the Court could “perceive a basis” that Congress could have
passed Section 4(e) to combat the inequality that illiterate Puerto Ricans
faced in trying to vote in New York, facilitating the conclusion to uphold

106. See Heart of Atlanta v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (applying the 1964 Civil Rights Act
against a hotel operator who refused to rent rooms to blacks under Article I, Section 8 commerce
clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (finding the 1964 Civil Rights Act applied
against a restaurant owner who refused to serve blacks under Article I, Section 8 Commerce
Clause). See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (holding, with a six Justice majority,
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to prescribe criminal penalties
under 18 U.S.C. Section 241 to punish private conspiracies depriving blacks use of state facilities);
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (finding Congress has the power to punish criminal and
racially motivated conduct by private individuals and state officials acting in concert to deprive
blacks civil rights under the “color of law” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 242).
107. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
108. Id. at 643.
109. Id. at 648-49, 659 n.7.
110. Id. at 648. Justice Brennan expanded on this point by saying “[i]t would confine the
legislative power in this context to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the
judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of
the judiciary by particularizing the ‘majestic generalities’ of [Section] 1 of the Amendment.” Id. at
648-49 (quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282-84).
111. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 421 (1819)). Justice Brennan also cited Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879), for
the same proposition. Id.
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the legislative choice.112
By requiring that Congress only “perceive” that it had a reasonable
premise for enacting the legislation, Morgan solidified rational basis
review as a deferential standard by which the Court would judge
prospective laws purportedly within the scope of any of the rights
protected in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, but
with one exception, Brennan’s view of the Court’s role in Section 5
cases is contrary to the one espoused by Justice Bradley in The Civil
Rights Cases.
Unlike Brennan, Bradley was wary of national
interference and would quickly use the Court’s authority to nullify
legislation that encroached on the power of the states to make laws
protecting, or removing, individual liberty. Bradley’s version of judicial
deference in construing the parameters of the Fourteenth Amendment is
ostensibly an allegiance to the sovereign states; and, in theory, it was of
little consequence that state legislatures’ could (and did) eliminate
personal freedom. Brennan’s loyalty, on the other hand, remained
superficially, with Congress. But it mattered greatly to him if any
legislature, national or state, compromised individual liberty because he
feared that “the written guarantees of liberty” would ossify into “mere
paper protections”113 without the judiciary’s help. In this fashion his
actual support lay with his commitment to the Fourteenth Amendment
because Brennan, in Morgan, was willing to cede judicial power to
Congress only if the national legislature enacted appropriate laws that
enhanced, but did not restrict, Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.114 By
understanding Section 5 power as an affirmative, but in essence one
directional grant of power, Brennan was distinct from Bradley: both
differed on the core issues of federalism and rights’ protection, at least
regarding whether the judiciary should use its power to upset state rights
when the national legislature acted to preserve Section 1 liberty. Yet, by
being one directional, Brennan was identical to Bradley since both were
prepared to invoke judicial power when the situation, or the
constitutional politics of the moment, called for it.115 Stated differently,
112. Id. at 653, 656.
113. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 3-4.
114. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. In this famous, and sometimes sharply criticized
footnote, Justice Brennan said that “Congress’ power under [Section] 5 is limited to adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; [Section] 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.” Id.
115. The “situation,” for Bradley, might be to protect state sovereignty and preserve, in the
process, Southern white supremacy. For Brennan, the “situation” might be to protect national
power and expand minority rights, if Congress acted consistently with a broad conception of the
Fourteenth Amendment; or conversely, it might be to reject national or state power if either
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while Brennan might have been able to mask the federalism implications
of his position by rationalizing that Congress usually enjoys plenary
express authority over the states in making choices about how to best
preserve liberty, Bradley might too have been able to minimize the
consequences of his anti-civil rights beliefs by saying that the Court’s
role was to protect the states, an outcome that would, in his view, best
safeguard the balance of federalism.
In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan II, the grandson of the
jurist who wrote the stirring dissents in The Civil Rights Cases and
Plessy v. Ferguson, exposed the arbitrariness of Justice Brennan’s
interpretation by accusing the Court of reading Section 5 as a
congressional license to “define the substantive scope of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment.”116 For Harlan II, the majority violated the
equal protection principle that New York was not under a greater burden
to prove that it reasonably, and rationally, treated voters who were
literate differently than those who were not.117 As a matter of
federalism, Harlan also argued that it was a “necessary prerequisite [for]
bringing the [Section] 5 power into play at all” to have the Court, instead
of Congress, determine if having literacy qualifications violates the
Constitution.118 In advocating judicial restraint, Justice Harlan II wanted
“empirical” proof to show that Congress was acting to remedy a state
law that the judiciary has said, or is willing to say, violates basic
constitutional rights.119 In contrast to Brennan’s position, Harlan II’s
theory of Congress’ Section 5 power was not one directional, for his
federalism rhetoric allowed the legislature very little flexibility to
determine, in theory, what the best solution was to the race problem in
remedial Fourteenth Amendment terms.120
Harlan II’s restraint-oriented interpretation of the scope of Section
5 authority would prevail as the country, and the Court, became more
legislature compromised personal freedoms under the Fourteenth Amendment. The point is that
either Justice would employ judicial power to achieve what they strongly believed in.
116. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 660-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 666.
119. Harlan makes this point by comparing Morgan to Heart of Atlanta. Id. at 669. In Heart
of Atlanta, the Court based its judgment on a voluminous legislative record of discrimination in the
states, whereas in Morgan, there were no legislative findings of discrimination that support Section
4(e)’s enactment and the argument that the Act would correct the constitutional violation. Id. at
669-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
120. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 649. See also U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 784 (1965), where
Justice Brennan said “[v]iewed in its proper perspective, [Section 5] of the Fourteenth Amendment
appears as a positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for all citizens.” Id.
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politically conservative over the next generation. In light of the ensuing
conservative retrenchment, the Court’s holding in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.121 remains a bold reaffirmation of Congress’ enforcement
power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. But the Warren
Court was about to recede into history, so Jones perhaps is best judged
as a constitutional relic about the scope, and promise, of what
congressional power can be under Section 5 in the hands of a benevolent
bench. As the Court’s composition changed, Morgan’s rational basis
standard would be replaced by a rigorous form of strict scrutiny that
characterized the Court’s approach in The Civil Rights Cases. Instead of
framing constitutional issues in terms of testing Congress’ competency
to make rational choices about the means it used to effectuate the ends of
legislation it enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
increasingly evaluated the scope of enforcement power by asking if an
independent judiciary can relinquish its supremacy to the legislature
when it acts through its lawmaking to define the Amendment’s
substantive meaning.122 Because the questions are distinct, so too are the
answers that the Supreme Court gave about the scope of the legislature’s
ability to protect civil rights and liberties.
Beginning in the Burger Court (1969-85), the Court thus more
actively sought to constrain congressional discretion by reasserting, and
sometimes resurrecting, the concept of state sovereignty in federalism
cases implicating the Fourteenth Amendment.123 Perhaps the best
example is National League of Cities v. Usery,124 a five-to-four ruling
that was later overruled when Justice Harry Blackmun changed his
Usery, pro-states’ vote in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.125 Usery decided whether Congress had Commerce Clause
authority to extend Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) minimum
121. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding Congress has enforcement power under the Thirteenth
Amendment to fight private racial discrimination).
122. Compare Katzenbach, 384 U.S. 641 (Brennan, J., Opinion for the Court), with Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 209 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The role of final arbiter belongs to this
Court.”).
123. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112; Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976).
124. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
125. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The membership at the time Usery and Garcia was identical with
the exception of the addition in 1981 of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who replaced Potter Stewart
and his pro-states’ right vote in Usery and then, in effect, in his place in Garcia. Hence, the
dissenters in Usery, Justices Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Bryon White and John Paul Stevens,
became the majority when Blackmun switched his vote, thereby relegating the Usery majority
(Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Lewis Powell) to the dissenting bloc
in Garcia.
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wage and maximum hour requirements to state employees. Although
conceding Congress had plenary commerce power under Article I,
Section 8, Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist’s opinion for the
Court said there are limits in applying it to private activity since “the
means chosen by Congress must be reasonably adapted to the end
permitted by the Constitution.”126 Thus, he observed that “[t]his Court
has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress to
override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary
powers to tax or to regulate commerce.”127 Consequently, Rehnquist
looked to the Tenth Amendment, which he suggested is not a truism but
rather an affirmative limitation on national power, as the method to
prevent national commercial regulation of the “States as States.”128
Notably, Rehnquist looked to a trio of past precedents (penned by
Chief Justice Salmon Chase) to emphasize that the “Court recogniz[ed]
the essential role of the States in our federal system of government.”129
In Texas v. White,130 for example, the Court established the principle that
“the Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States.”131 In Lane County v. Oregon,132
moreover, the Court stated that the Constitution “distinctly recogniz[es]”
not only the “necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper
spheres, the independent authority of the States. . . .”133 And, with
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,134 the Court asserted that “neither [federal or
state] government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial
manner the exercise of its powers.”135 As applied, these precedents
demonstrated that the FLSA wage and hour provisions
unconstitutionally interfered with “integral” state functions by regulating
“attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government”; and
Congress had no power to control these “traditional aspects of state
sovereignty” under the Commerce Clause, in accordance with the Tenth

126. Usery, 426 U.S. 840 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262
(1964)).
127. Id. at 842 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (where it said the Court
had “ample power to prevent . . . ‘the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political
entity. . . .’”).
128. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842-43.
129. Id. at 844.
130. 74 U.S. 700 (1869).
131. Usery, 426 U.S. at 844 (citing Texas v. White, 7 U.S. 700, 725 (1869)).
132. 74 U.S. 71 (1869).
133. Usery, 426 U.S. at 844 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869)).
134. 269 U.S. 514 (1926).
135. Usery, 426 U.S. at 844 (quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926)).
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Amendment.136
Although, in a footnote, Usery declined to proffer if the outcome
would have been different if Congress based its regulation on either
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or Congress’ spending power
under Article I, Section 8.137 Dissenting Justice Brennan immediately
understood the significance of the Court’s holding for subsequent
federalism cases. He relied on United States v. California138 to maintain
that the states are subordinate to the national government when the latter
acts within the scope of its delegated authority.139 He chided his
colleagues for “manufactur[ing] an abstraction without substance,
founded neither in the words of the Constitution nor on precedent” the
idea that Congress was disabled by the Tenth Amendment from
regulating, through the commerce power, the “States qua States.”140 Not
only was this position a repudiation of “a long line” of precedents
holding otherwise (including McCulloch v. Maryland141), it was a result
that “patent[ly] usurp[ed]” the role that the political process plays in
imposing restraints on Congress’ commerce authority.142 Brennan
thundered:
My Brethren do more than turn aside longstanding constitutional
jurisprudence that emphatically rejects today’s conclusion. More
alarming is the startling restructuring of our federal system, and the
role they create therein for the federal judiciary. This Court is simply
not at liberty to erect a mirror of its own conception of a desirable
governmental structure. If the 1974 amendments have any “vice,” my
Brother Stevens [in a separate dissent] is surely right that it represents
“merely . . . a policy issue which has been firmly resolved by the
branches of government having power to decide such questions.” It
bears repeating “that effective restraints on . . . exercise of the
commerce power must proceed from political rather than from judicial
processes.”143

For Brennan, Usery was a repudiation of judicial restraint and,
136. Id. at 845-52.
137. Id. at 852 n.17.
138. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
139. Usery, 426 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175, 184 (1936)). In California, Chief Justice Harlan Stone repudiated the view that a state had
sovereign powers by stating that “[t]he sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the
extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution.” Id.
140. Usery, 426 U.S. at 860.
141. Id. at 860-61; See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
142. Usery, 426 U.S. at 857-58.
143. Id. at 875-76 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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instead, an activist result that improperly altered the balance of the
federal structure by rejecting the notion that “political safeguards” of
federalism would adequately protect the states from national
overreaching.144
In time, Brennan’s objections were vindicated in Garcia v.
SAMTA,145 a 1985 ruling that features Justice Harry Blackmun’s
decision to bolt from the Usery majority and write law professor Herbert
Wechsler’s political safeguards’ argument into constitutional law.146
But, as the sharp disagreement about the proper scope of judicial power
illustrates, in 1985 the Court was not of one mind about what federalism,
or what state sovereignty in a system of federalism meant. Although
Usery and Garcia centered on the Tenth Amendment’s place as an
affirmative constraint on otherwise plenary commerce power, the
federalism conflict concerned whether the states surrendered their
sovereignty or, in later parlance, their “dignity”,147 at the time of the
Constitution’s ratification by the states. For, if they did, as Justice
Brennan maintained, the states could not be co-equal sovereigns
whenever Congress reasonably used its delegated discretion to achieve a
legitimate legislative objective in regulating the national economy. In
Brennan’s view, showing judicial deference to Congress was an
affirmation of the careful balance the Framers struck between that
national government and the states at the founding.
The Garcia dissenters countered by stating that it was wrong to
presume the national political system, either structurally or through the
principle of representation, can actually protect the states. Political
safeguards are superfluous, because they do nothing to preserve state
interests in light of an increasing commerce power, burgeoning federal
regulation, the popular election of senators (rather than from the state
legislatures as originally conceived) via the Seventeenth Amendment,
and the nearly omnipotence impact of interest groups in the national
political process.148 More fundamentally, the dissenting position
144. Id. at 876-77. Notably, Brennan cited Herbert Wechsler’s famous article for the same
proposition. See id. at 877, citing Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954).
145. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
146. Id. at 549-55 (Blackmun, J., Opinion for the Court); But see New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (O’Connor, J., Opinion for the Court).
147. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999); Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports
Authority, 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002). See also Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 93, 97 (2002).
148. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 557 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id.
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objected to the claim that the states somehow relinquished some or all of
their sovereignty at the time of the founding. Accordingly, the argument
about the Tenth Amendment’s effect on national power is only a
corollary to the basic insistence that the states are co-equal entities in a
dual sovereignty system of federalism.
As fate would have it, Rehnquist’s prediction that the dissenting
view in Garcia would “in time again command the support of a majority
of th[e] Court” accurately captured what happened when he assumed the
Chief Justice position a little more than one year later. Further, the
Court’s composition continued its lurch to the right with the strict
constructionist appointments of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George
H. Bush.149 Rehnquist was already the colleague of Sandra Day
O’Connor (1981) when he was elevated to Chief Justice in 1986 by
President Reagan. The confirmations of Antonin Scalia (1986),
Anthony Kennedy (1988) and Clarence Thomas (1991) positioned the
Court to implement the kind of judicial restraint that often characterizes
Rehnquist’s federalism jurisprudence.150 As the five conservative
justices coalesced into a majority, the Rehnquist Court (1986 - present)
has made significant inroads in curtailing, to an unprecedented level,
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment.151 It also has revitalized the Eleventh Amendment as a
means to limit federal judicial power by using the state sovereignty
argument that was temporarily defeated in Garcia in a string of
subsequent, far-reaching Section 5 cases.152 At the core of the Rehnquist
Court’s Section 5 cases is the anti-federalist conviction that close
judicial oversight is necessary to protect local interests from federal
domination since the U.S. Constitution, is structurally ineffectual in
affording the states meaningful representation. Accordingly, as it is
at 580 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See also David M. O’Brien, “Federalism as a Metaphor in the
Constitutional Politics of Public Administration,” 49 PUB. ADM. REV. 411, 412 (1989), where the
author observes that the Garcia dissenters could have also grounded their claims on other aspects of
increasing national power, including plenary taxing and spending authority and, of course, the
Supreme Court’s nationalization of the Bill of Rights through its selective incorporation theory.
149. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see generally Gottschall, Reagan’s
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70
JUDICATURE 48 (1986).
150. Thomas’ 1991 confirmation was especially significant since Thomas replaced Justice
Thurgood Marshall, and Justice William Brennan had left the Court a year earlier (replaced by
David Souter in 1990). THE OXFORD GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 394 (Kermit
L. Hall ed., 1999).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
152. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 1125 (1996); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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discussed in Section II, the Court’s decision-making features the creation
of a new “means and ends” test that makes it virtually impossible for
Congress to argue that its legislative choices can satisfy constitutional
muster.
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT’S ANTI-FEDERALIST REVIVAL
The boldness of Rehnquist’s approach in Usery would be repeated,
and come to fruition, in U.S. v. Lopez,153 the first Supreme Court ruling
since 1936 to invalidate a congressional statute passed under the
commerce clause.154 Lopez’s significance is underscored by three earlier
federalism decisions reflecting the movement toward a firm, and
intensified, judicial commitment to protecting states’ interests.155
Gregory v. Ashcroft156 is particularly instructive, as Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court upheld Missouri’s choice to impose a
mandatory retirement age of seventy on state judges through its
Constitution. O’Connor rebuffed the argument that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause and was contrary to the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), reasoning that the “system of dual
sovereignty” created by the Constitution’s structure gave the State, a cosovereign, the discretion to set the qualifications of those who govern
it.157 While she conceded that the structural political safeguards might
protect the states against Congress’ exercise of its plenary commerce
authority, O’Connor nonetheless decided the case by determining if
Congress clearly established its intent to have the ADEA’s apply to
appointed state judges.158 “This plain statement rule,” O’Connor
explained, “is nothing more than an acknowledgement that the States
retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme,
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”159 As applied,
Congress did not express its intent clearly, so the ADEA was
inapplicable and the people’s choice to make state judges retire at 70
was upheld.160
153. 514 U.S. 547 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., Opinion for the Court) (striking down Congress’
Gun-Free Zones Act of 1990 as an invalid exercise of commerce power).
154. See id. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting).
155. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (finding the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act inapplicable to appointed state judges); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
156. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
157. Id. at 457-63.
158. Id. at 467.
159. Id. at 460, 464.
160. Id. at 473.
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Dissenting Justice Byron White objected that the plain statement
requirement substantially undercut Congress’ use of the commerce
power while avoiding the “constitutional problem” of respecting
legislative supremacy and the operation of the political safeguards
principle.161 He also chided the Court for dismissing the possibility that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could have been used as
alternative grounds to validly apply the ADEA to the states. O’Connor
conceded this as a possibility by admitting that the Court, in past cases,
held that the Civil War Amendments can be an enforcement mechanism
under Section 5 that outweighs federalism principles favoring
recognition of state sovereignty.162 Justice White questioned its source
as well, claiming that the Court improperly manufactured it from
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,163 an inapposite Eleventh
Amendment case.164
White’s lament in Gregory was refined into extant constitutional
doctrine in the Court’s subsequent federalism and Section 5
jurisprudence, particularly in the aftermath of Thomas’ November 1991
confirmation and White’s retirement in July 1993.165 Like Brennan
before him, White surely perceived that the Court was in the formative
stages of a new federalism revolution. National legislation would be
tested against a re-invigorated concept of state sovereignty that
increasingly became the judicial mantra for affirmatively limiting not
only Congress’ otherwise sacrosanct commerce power, but also as the
means to wipe the dust off the Tenth, and now, the Eleventh

161. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 479 (White, J., dissenting). He also argued it conflicts with the
Court’s pre-emption rules. Id. at 475. This argument would be repeated later by Justice John Paul
Stevens in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
658 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 479; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment’s principle of state sovereignty is limited by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment). In Gregory, Justice O’Connor observed that the Court, in EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), left open the question of whether the national legislature could have
used Section 5 as the source for extending the ADEA to the states. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 468.
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion answered it by stating that “[i]n the face of such ambiguity
[about Congress’s intent for the ADEA to cover state appointed judges], we will not attribute to
Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted
pursuant to its Commerce Clause or [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 470.
163. 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (barring private action in federal court since Congress did not,
in unmistakable language, express its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
through the Rehabilitation Act).
164. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 476 (White, J., dissenting).
165. Justice Thomas replaced Thurgood Marshall in 1991, and Ruth B. Ginsburg replaced
Justice White in August 1993. OXFORD GUIDE TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
394 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1999).
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Amendment. As Gregory (and later, Lopez) signaled, the Court was
going use its judicial authority to be a champion of state sovereignty. It
demonstrated that it was prepared to discover innovative principles, like
the plain statement rule, to defend states’ rights.
In the next two terms after Lopez the Court decided Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida166 and City of Boerne v. Flores.167 These two
landmark rulings greatly limited federal judicial power under the
Eleventh Amendment (Seminole) and federal legislative power (Boerne)
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth. While Lopez settled whether the
Tenth Amendment could nullify congressional legislation under Article
1, Section 8, in overturning Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company168
Seminole Tribe held that the Indian Commerce Clause could not
authorize private lawsuits by Indian Tribes against states in federal court
under the Eleventh Amendment.169 Then, after recognizing that the
Eleventh Amendment affords the states’ immunity as an “attribute” of
their sovereignty, in a five-to-four decision Chief Justice Rehnquist
dismissed the proposition that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(enacted under Article I, Section 8, clause 3) gave the tribes a federal
forum for compelling Florida to negotiate in good faith and enter into a
compact for the purpose of legally engaging in gaming activities.170
Florida, the Chief Justice noted, did not consent to be sued; thus
Congress lacked the power to abrogate the immunity granted the state by
the Eleventh Amendment, in spite of Congress’ clear intention to do so,
as expressed in the legislation.171
Gregory’s plain statement rule emasculated the national
legislature’s ability to upset the sovereign choices of a state because the
federal ADEA did not clearly express an intent to apply it to state

166. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
167. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
168. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
169. Seminole, 517 U.S. 44. The deciding pro-national fifth vote was cast by Justice White.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Opinion for the Court).
170. Id. at 54; see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (Eleventh Amendment bars
lawsuits in federal court by citizens against their own State if State has not consented to being sued).
Prior to Seminole, Hans is generally considered the outer limits of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity doctrine. Christopher E. Sherer, The Resurgence of Federalism: State Employees and the
Eleventh Amendment, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2001).
171. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72. “Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.” Id. The Court’s analysis was
guided by two questions: 1) Did Congress unequivocally express its intent to abrogate immunity?;
and 2) Does Congress have the constitutional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to do so? Id. at 55.
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citizens purportedly covered under the statute. The plain statement
rule’s cousin, the “clear statement rule,”172 was applied in Seminole to
deny Congress the power to let Indian Tribes sue a state and disrupt its
sovereignty, even though it unequivocally indicated an intent to do so.173
Seminole is also significant for leaving intact only one of the two
remaining basises for Congress to ground its authority to abrogate state
sovereignty immunity, namely the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power in Section 5.174 Thus, by eliminating Union Gas, Seminole told
Congress it no longer enjoyed power to circumvent state immunity by
relying on the Commerce or Supremacy Clause.175
Shortly after Seminole the Court used the Eleventh Amendment to
immunize unconsenting states from federal claims in state courts.176
Yet, it also used Seminole to voice respect for Congress’ Section 5
authority to constrain, in theory, state sovereignty in Eleventh
Amendment cases.177 The Court also started to utilize the principles
crafted in Boerne to insure that the judiciary would be able to
superintend closely the choices the national legislature made when it
passed laws affecting the states in all federalism cases with civil rights
and liberties implications. In Boerne, Congress relied on Section 5 to
enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),
legislation having the effect of reversing the Court’s 1990 decision in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith.178 The RFRA represented Congress’ repudiation of Smith, which
jettisoned the balancing test approach that had long characterized
judicial review of free exercise cases involving state laws (e.g.
unemployment compensation statutes) that failed to exempt certain
religious practices from their coverage at the expense of religious
liberty.179 The new law hence replaced Smith’s more restrictive “general
172. Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 238-39 (1985)).
173. Id. at 56.
174. Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976)). Hence, Fitzpatrick is
important because it adheres to the principle that the Eleventh Amendment immunity can be
abrogated by a federal law enacted under Section 5 authority.
175. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 93-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Notably, a State can also
consent to be sued by waiving its rights not to be subject to litigation. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 670 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
Opinion for the Court). See also Sherer, supra note 171, at 7.
176. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
177. See, e.g., College Savings, 527 U.S. 672 (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. 445).
178. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
179. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (nullifying state unemployment
compensation denying benefits to Seven Day Adventist who refused to work on day of Sabbath).
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applicability” standard with the more familiar and lenient balancing
test,180 a policy judgment that was negated by the Supreme Court in
Boerne.
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court described Section
5 as a broad grant of authority that is limited in its operation. Kennedy
first cast doubt on whether Congress’ purpose in passing the RFRA was
legitimate, as there was little in the legislative record to indicate that
there was a “widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this
country.”181 This was significant, Kennedy continued, for only federal
law that “deters or remedies constitutional violations” is a legitimate
exercise of legislative discretion, “even if in the process [the
enforcement power] prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy’
previously reserved to the States.”182 But where Congress alters the
constitutional meaning of a right, as it does here, congressional action
will not be sustained because it is not “enforcing” the liberties outlined
in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.183 Accordingly, only laws
exhibiting “congruence and a proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end” are
constitutionally valid, since those without it are deficient because they
may be too “substantive in operation and effect.”184 As a result, the
standard empowers the judiciary to determine if Congress has not
overstepped its bounds by creating inappropriate legislation under
Section 5 that impermissibly puts too much substantive meaning on the
rights outlined in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the Court’s view, the Constitution’s text, structure and history
supported the creation of the congruence and proportionality test.185 Of
particular relevance was the framers’ decision to reject Ohio
representative John Bingham’s first draft of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a proposal exacerbating the fear that Congress would
interfere with “traditional areas of state responsibility” by permitting it
to enact “all laws” that are “necessary and proper” to secure Section 1
180. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (upholding criminal prosecution against native Americans
claiming exemption from state law based on religious use of peyote). Scalia fashioned the “general
applicability” principle to evaluate the constitutionality of state laws allegedly burdening free
exercise. It stated that laws having an “incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision” do not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 878.
181. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997).
182. Id. at 518 (emphasis provided) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
183. Id. at 519.
184. Id. at 520.
185. Id. at 515-29.
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liberties.186 The new draft (and the final enactment) that replaced
Bingham’s initial version signified that Congress’ power is limited to
correcting unjust state legislation that violated Section 1 guarantees.187
This interpretation is accurate, said Kennedy, for it respects “traditional
separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary” by investing
in the Court the power to construe the meaning of self-executing
provisions of the Bill of Rights.188 If it were otherwise, and Congress
instead of the Court was able to determine what the Constitution meant
substantively, “[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the
Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed
amendment process contained in Article V.”189
The Court’s interpretativism in Boerne is demonstrated by its
reading of precedent, namely its re-affirmation of The Civil Rights
Cases190 and its corresponding denigration of that case’s antithesis,
Katzenbach v. Morgan.191 Whereas the former opinion epitomized the
tenet that enforcement legislation must be corrective against (largely)
state action,192 the expansive character of the latter (presumably because
of Morgan’s footnote ten) was “not a necessary interpretation . . . or
even the best one.”193 Indeed, Justice Kennedy strained to put the best
light he could on Morgan, observing that one of the alternative rationales
supported its result because the Court at that time “perceived a factual
basis on which Congress could have concluded that New York’s literacy
requirement” was discriminatory and an equal protection violation.194
What Morgan actually said, though, is that the Court could have
“perceive[d] a basis,” not necessarily a “factual” one, as Kennedy
wrote.195 The judicial gloss put on the phrase is subtle, but nonetheless
significant. It allowed Kennedy to align Morgan with his reading of

186. Id. at 520-22.
187. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522-23.
188. Id. at 523-24.
189. Id. at 529.
190. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
191. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
192. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-25.
193. Id. at 528. Kennedy obliquely refers to Morgan as having language that “could be
interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights
contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 527-28. However, he does not cite
footnote 10 in Morgan. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641, n.10.
194. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (emphasis added). The other rationale was that Section 4(e) of the
1965 Voting Rights Act is remedial because it corrects “discrimination in governmental services.”
Id. at 528.
195. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641, 653 & 656. Compare Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641, with
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach196 and Oregon v. Mitchell, two cases that,
in Boerne, suggested that the Court must limit the enforcement power by
stringently reviewing whether Congress compiled an extensive
legislative record to document the pervasive nature of the constitutional
problem that the legislation is supposed to correct.197
While Justice Kennedy discovered a way to reconcile the Court’s
past anti-federalist interpretation of Section 5 cases with more
progressive opinions coming from the Warren Court, he failed to explain
the constitutional origin or justification for the language he utilized to
construct the congruence and proportionality standard.198 Nevertheless,
as a legal standard it remains a reformulated, but more stringent, version
of the “means/ends” inquiry that has characterized the judiciary’s past
assessment of “appropriate” legislation.199
In theory, evaluating
congruence and proportionality asks if the federal law is not only
remedial but also a deterrent to the commission of future constitutional
violations.200 As applied, it imposes a number of doctrinal and
pragmatic constraints on Congress’ ability to fix or prevent perceived
unconstitutional behavior by the states or private parties. In other words,
it is a constitutional trump card that the Court can play at any time to
nullify national legislation that, from the Marble Temple’s vantage point
on Front Street, deems “inappropriate.” It is not surprising, then, that the
Rehnquist Court has used it along with more generalized anti-federalist
legal principles to negate congressional action in several post-Boerne
federalism cases, particularly in those testing the limits of Eleventh
196. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
197. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525-28.
198. Justice Kennedy does not specifically explain where the terms “congruence” or
“proportionality” come from, although he indirectly refers to “means/ends” by examining past
precedent. In certain areas of jurisprudence, like affirmative action, cases like Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), have applied a means/ends test to uphold the constitutionality of a
ten percent set aside (of federal monies) for public works projects for minority-owned businesses;
but there, only three Justices (Burger, Powell, and White) of a six-Justice plurality (Marshall,
Brennan, and Blackmun) agreed that Congress tailored the law narrowly enough under the
legislative objectives pursuant to either Section 5 or the Article 1 spending clause. Perhaps that is
why Fullilove is not cited by Kennedy in Boerne, but it does not explain why he did not attempt to
trace the Court’s usage of the means/ends test in past precedent (other than to refer generally to The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) in support of the means/ends rationale). See Boerne, 521 U.S.
507. For an analysis of the Court’s usage of means/ends and Fullilove’s significance, see Marci A.
Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, Symposium, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469 (1999) (arguing Boerne’s
proportionality standard is clearly traceable to past Supreme Court cases).
199. See Evan H. Caminker, Symposium, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5
Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001).
200. Christopher E. Sherer, The Resurgence of Federalism: State Employees and the Eleventh
Amendment, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & Pol’y 1, 8 (2001).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss3/2

34

Banks: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
BANKS1.DOC

2003]

5/5/03 12:07 PM

SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

459

Amendment sovereign immunity.201
Hence, in five-to-four rulings, with College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board202 and
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank203 the Supreme Court held that neither the 1992
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (College Savings) or the 1992
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Florida
Prepaid) validly abrogated, under Section 5, state sovereign
immunity.204 In College Savings, the Court dismissed a private action
for damages that was based on the contention that a state’s alleged use of
false descriptions or representations concerning a patent qualified as a
constitutionally protected property right under the Due Process Clause,
notably without even applying the congruence and proportionality
test.205 Whereas the Court could not find a right to enforce in College
Savings, it reached the question of appropriateness in its companion
case, Florida Prepaid. There, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality
opinion reasoned that the Patent Remedy Act was not remedial because
there was little evidence in the legislative record to prove that Congress
was responding to an identifiable pattern of patent infringement (or
constitutional violations) by the states or, in fact, a national problem.206
Thus, the Act was an unconstitutional enforcement mechanism, since
disproportionate means were used to achieve a perceived, but
unsubstantiated, end.207
Having shown it was reluctant to extend Section 5 power to cure
due process violations in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,208 the
Court, in the next term addressed whether Congress can use Section 5 to
prevent alleged violations of equal protection originating from age
discrimination. Although Congress exhibited a clear intent in the Age
201. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (1999); Fla. Prepaid PostSecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
202. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
203. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
204. College Savings held that the state did not constructively waive its sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the Act did not validly abrogate it. 527 U.S. 666. In so
holding, the Court overturned Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co. of Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184
(1964). Id. at 680. Florida Prepaid held that Congress intended to abrogate immunity, but could
not validly do so because Congress lacked Section 5 authority. 527 U.S. 627.
205. 527 U.S. at 672.
206. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641.
207. Id. at 640.
208. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003

35

Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 3, Art. 2
BANKS1.DOC

460

5/5/03 12:07 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:425

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, the Court held (as per Justice Sandra Day O’Connor) that it
lacked the power under Section 5 to subject non-consenting States to
private lawsuits in federal court alleging age discrimination. After
acknowledging that Section 5 gives Congress the authority to remedy
and deter rights’ violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, O’Connor
reiterated the Boerne principle that the Congress had little say in
fashioning the content of what those rights are.209 Rather, she declared,
“[t]he ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial
Branch.”210
From this premise the Court applied Boerne’s congruence and
proportionality test for appropriateness. In doing so O’Connor observed
that Congress, in providing “indiscriminate” substantive and
prophylactic remedies under the ADEA, failed to establish in
“widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States.”211
Notably, the implications of having a scant record were more profound,
if not conclusive, in deciding the case. As O’Connor explained, the
Court’s past equal protection jurisprudence has, in effect, given the
states more latitude to engage in age discrimination without running
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment, provided the offending state can
demonstrate that its age classification is rationally connected to a
legitimate state interest. Because of rational basis review, in other
words, the Court cannot use heightened scrutiny and require “a tighter fit
between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve,”
as would be the case in lawsuits testing race or gender classifications.212
As a result, in Kimel the Court sent at least three anti-federalist
messages: 1) that the Court is the final arbiter of what the Fourteenth
Amendment substantively means; 2) that states can sometimes
reasonably discriminate on the basis of age classifications in spite of the
Equal Protection Clause; and, 3) that Congress has limited Section 5
power to combat age discrimination in the states only if it can prove, in
the legislative record or otherwise, that it enacted remedial or
prophylactic legislation in response to a national problem of age
discrimination occurring in the states.213
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
“Section

Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 83-84.
In ruling that Congress lacked power under Section 5, Kimel also answered the open
5” question raised in light of the holding in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983)
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In a dissent joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice
Stevens in Kimel expressed dismay at the Court’s hubris in extolling
state immunity while dismissing the structural political safeguards
argument that once held sway in adjudicating federalism cases.214 Even
so, United States v. Morrison and Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, indicate that the Court-centered anti-federalist
philosophy is firmly entrenched in the five-Justice plurality that often
controls the outcome of federalism cases. In Morrison, the Court held
that Congress did not have commerce or Section 5 authority to supply
victims of gender-motivated violence with civil remedies in federal court
through the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA).215
Relative to the Section 5 issue, the Chief Justice, in a five-to-four ruling,
acknowledged that a “voluminous congressional record” was compiled
to document the abuses suffered by victims of gender discrimination in
state courts.216 Yet in light of the language and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment and, in accordance with past precedent,217 Congress had
limited power to devise remedies against non-state (i.e. private)
actors.218 Thus, the Court ruled the Boerne test of proportionality was
not satisfied because the VAWA was not corrective enough in terms of
combating discriminatory violence from the operation of state laws or
officers.219 Moreover, in dicta, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed
Kimel’s conviction that it is the duty of the Court, and not Congress, to
discern the Constitution’s final meaning.220
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett
reaffirmed that “it is the responsibility of this Court”221 to limit the
substantive reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. There, the Chief
Justice for a five-to-four Court held that two state employees (one was
diagnosed with breast cancer and, after treatment, demoted in her nurse’s
job at a state hospital) could not sue under the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) for money damages in federal court because

(holding that the ADEA was a valid exercise of national commerce power on the states in spite of
the Tenth Amendment). See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78.
214. Id. at 92-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 and 626 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., Opinion for the
Court).
216. Id. at 620, 625.
217. Id. at 621-26 (citing principally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), as supportive of the state action doctrine).
218. Id. at 620-21.
219. Id. at 625.
220. Id. at 616 n.7.
221. 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (emphasis provided).
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Congress did not have Section 5 power to abrogate state immunity.222
After noting that the Court’s equal protection analysis concerning the
disabled required rationality review, Rehnquist concluded that the
“States are not required . . . to make special accommodations for the
disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are
rational.”223 After identifying the scope of the constitutional right,
Rehnquist next applied Boerne’s congruence standard to hold that
Congress exceeded its power by creating an anti-discrimination remedy
on the states because there was insufficient proof that the states were
irrationally engaged in a consistent and recurring past pattern of
discrimination.224 In contrast to legislation that enforced the Fifteenth
Amendment’s proscription against racial discrimination in voting, the
record did not disclose that Congress “explored with great care” the
problem of how those with disabilities are treated in the states.225
Accordingly, as the Boerne progeny illustrates, the Court in Garrett
ruled that the remedy (i.e. the ADA) was disproportionate to the aim of
eliminating discrimination against the disabled.226
III. NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. HIBBS AND THE
POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
As Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents and Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett reveal, state-sponsored age (Kimmel)
and disability (Garrett) classifications are presumptively constitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause because the Court evaluates them
under rational basis review. Thus, when Congress devises a statutory
remedy to combat state-sponsored discrimination involving
presumptively constitutional conduct, it is harder under the congruence
and proportionality test for Congress to claim that it is an appropriate
exercise of Section 5 power. Congress has to compile an extensive
record to justify that its remedy is a proportionate response to the
perceived discriminatory evil it is trying to eradicate. Part of that
justification, also, requires the legislature to establish that it is acting in

222. Id.
223. Id. at 367 (interpreting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985)). Rehnquist continued by saying that the States “could be quite hard headedly—and perhaps
hardheartedly—hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the
disabled. If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from
positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 367-68.
224. Id. at 368-74.
225. Id. at 373.
226. Id. at 374.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss3/2

38

Banks: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
BANKS1.DOC

2003]

5/5/03 12:07 PM

SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

463

an area of law that the Court has recognized as a legitimate province of
rights’ protection, as in race-based voting rights cases. To be sure, as
City of Boerne v. Flores indicates, Congress’ burden is even greater
when it enacts prophalytic legislation in a social policy area that
arguably goes beyond the substantive limits the Court has imposed on
the meaning of rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In United States v. Morrison the Court ruled that a victim of
gender-based violence could not sue under the Equal Protection Clause
because the Violence Against Women’s Act was not directed at State
action; hence, it was an invalid exercise of Section 5 power.227 Because
the Court did not find that there was a protected right to be enforced in
Morrison, it is an open question whether Congress can provide a remedy
under Section 5 in a sex-based discrimination case involving Eleventh
Amendment immunity. One would intuit that Congress would have an
easier time proving to the Court that it is appropriately enforcing a
statutory remedy that is directed against state conduct that is
presumptively unconstitutional because of heightened scrutiny.228
Indeed, in Kimel the Court reiterated that states have less leeway to
demonstrate that race or gender-based classifications are validly serving
legitimate legislative objectives.229 Moreover, even though the Court
has said that what the record reveals is not necessarily determinative in
evaluating whether the law is appropriately proportionate to the
perceived harm,230 Congress probably has a better chance of convincing
the Court that the legislative means fit the ends if it can establish that it
is reacting to a pervasive, nationwide problem of gender discrimination.
These propositions will be tested in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs,231 where the Supreme Court will decide in the 20022003 Term if the Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that Congress
intended, and had the constitutional power, to abrogate Nevada’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity from a private lawsuit claming damages

227. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000).
228. See Sherer, supra note 159, at 20-21.
229. See Kimmel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84. “[W]hen a State discriminates on the
basis of race or gender, we required a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the
legitimate ends they serve.” Id.
230. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646
(1999).
231. Hibbs v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S.
Ct. 2618 (2002). The U.S. Supreme Court entertained oral arguments in the case on January 15,
2002. See Transcript of Oral Argument in Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs (No. 01-1368)
(Jan. 15, 2003), available at, http://www.supremecourtus.gov (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
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under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).232
Specifically, the Court will review if the Ninth Circuit was correct in
limiting states’ rights and ruling in favor of William Hibbs, who used the
FMLA in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause to claim he was entitled to money damages when the
state fired him because he used too much leave to care for his ailing
wife. After finding that Congress intended to displace immunity, the
circuit court next held that Congress had Section 5 power to abrogate
Nevada’s immunity because it was the state’s burden (and not
Congress’) to prove that the state had not engaged in past acts of
unconstitutional gender discrimination in the workplace. That
reallocation of proof, the court reasoned, was justified because
heightened scrutiny, instead of rational basis review, controlled the
outcome of gender-based discrimination cases. In other words, laws like
the FMLA are presumptively constitutional in that they prevent gender
discrimination and, therefore, “the burden is on the challenger of the
legislation to prove that the states have not engaged in a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct.”233 Accordingly, because Nevada could not
prove if a pattern of past gender discrimination did not exist, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that Hibbs, a private individual, could sue in federal court
using the FMLA as an appropriate remedial statute.234
Assuming that Congress can establish it intended to abrogate
immunity,235 the outcome in Hibbs might turn on whether the Supreme
Court accepts the lower court’s conclusion that the FMLA, like Section
5 legislation that is aimed at remedying gender discrimination, is
presumptively constitutional because of heightened judicial review. If
the Court agrees, then Nevada, instead of Congress, will have to prove
that there is no state-sponsored discrimination. If the burden is shifted,
then the law might be held to be appropriate since Congress need not
establish that it has created a law that corrects a widespread pattern of
sexually discriminatory conduct in the workplace. Notably, however,
the Court has another way to avoid making the choice about who
sustains the burden of proving unconstitutional behavior by ruling that
Congress went too far in defining the scope of the right at issue by

232. Plaintiff Hibbs alleged, inter alia, that his employer, the Nevada Department of Human
Resources, wrongfully terminated his position in contravention to the provisions of the Family and
Medical Leave Act. Hibbs, 273 F.3d 844.
233. Id. at 864 n.27.
234. Id. at 873.
235. This does not seem to be an obstacle since the FMLA “intent” mirrors the one in the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
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requiring states give at least twelve weeks of family leave. As the Hibbs
court observed (but concluded it was not a fatal defect in the Section 5
analysis), the operative provision of the FMLA, Section 2612(a)(1)(C),
“sweeps more broadly than the Equal Protection Clause itself” because
states providing less than twelve weeks of leave would be acting
constitutionally if they did so in a gender-neutral fashion.236 If that is the
case then the Supreme Court could rule against Hibbs on the basis that
Congress is improperly trying to change the substantive nature of a right
under equal protection law, something that can only be done by the
judiciary (as established in The City of Flores v. Boerne).237 In other
words, the reluctance of the Rehnquist Court to cede its authority to
determine what the meaning of the Constitution is, will in all likelihood,
strongly influence what the result will be in Hibbs.
A. Judicial Supremacy and the Role of History in Federalism (and
Section 5) Cases
As Hibbs will undoubtedly underscore, the debate surrounding the
scope of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive content is an ongoing constitutional enterprise. It is a
historical and contemporary fact of judicial life as the meaning of
Section 1 is timelessly indeterminate. Consequently, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s history suggests that the various compromises the framers
made to strike an agreement on the Amendment’s equality language is
an essential part of it “ultimate emptiness.”238 As law professor William
Nelson puts it,
Americans of 1866, like Americans of today, could all agree upon the
rightfulness of equality only because they did not agree on its meaning,
and their political leaders, unlike the managers of the modern
bureaucratic state, were content to enact the general principle rather
than its specific applications into law.239

If Nelson is correct, determining what equality specifically means
assumes less importance in the Section 5 debate, as long as the general
principle of equality remains true. Furthermore, the key question to
answer in contemplating Congress’ institutional role in protecting liberty
is whether the Court can justly reject legislation aiming to enforce the
236. 273 F.3d 844, 856.
237. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
238. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLES TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 80 (1988).
239. Id.
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equality principle, however defined, in palpable situations where social
inequality reigns. While it is useful to observe that the Amendment’s
historical origin is rooted in an attempt to aid blacks in securing their
political and legal rights in the aftermath of the Civil War, looking at
history is only the beginning, and not the end, of discovering the scope
of congressional power to enforce the Section 1 rights. What matters,
and what should drive any argument on the issue to its logical
conclusion, is that the Amendment must be given the benefit of its most
favorable equality construction whenever feasible, and contrary
justifications must not trump any attempt by government to provide for
the common good. It is hard to aver, at least plausibly, that giving all
persons, no matter what race, sex, creed or color, a lawful, and equal
opportunity to succeed in a free society is not a worthy goal that is part
of achieving the common good.240
Consequently, it can only be a distortion of history, and judicial
power, to permit a court to twist the salutary language (albeit couched in
generalities) of the Fourteenth Amendment into a judicial doctrine that
hinders, or destroys, basic civil rights. If Nelson is accurate in saying
that “[all could] agree on the rightfulness of equality,”241 then how can it
be correct, historically or otherwise, to argue that a judge or court can
use the highest law of the land to say that that Congress lacks the power
to make things equal? If anything, as Justice William Brennan
suggested in Katzenbach v. Morgan,242 congressional power to further
the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment should only be
nullified if the legislature enacts laws that take away the liberty of
individuals. If Congress is acting with an altruistic purpose, arguments
saying that it is giving too much liberty at the expense of the states are
specious and, perhaps, beside the point. After all, as Justice Stephen
Breyer reminds us, formalistic notions of sovereignty should not stand in
the way of the real object of the American system of federalism, which
is to protect citizen liberty.243 This idea was not lost on the Supreme
Court in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,244 a ruling that validated national
authority on the basis that the people’s sovereignty, and not the
240. As one framer of the Amendment, Thadeus Stevens, said: “The substance of section
one . . . required only that ‘the same laws must and shall apply to every mortal, American, Irishman,
African, German or Turk.’” Id. at 116.
241. Id. at 80.
242. 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
243. Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 702
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
244. 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Stevens, J., Opinion for the Court, joined by JJ. Souter, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kennedy).
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sovereignty of the states, is what matters most.245
Does it change anything to concede that the national, or state,
government has more sovereign power than the other if both are
committed, in theory, to promoting social equality? What does history
tell us in trying to answer that question? First, the history aimed at
trying to discover the framing intent of the Fourteenth Amendment is
inconclusive, because there are compelling arguments on both sides of
the debate concerning the scope of national power to define Section 1
rights.246 While of course relevant, the history of trying to determine
what the founding generation meant in constructing a political system
featuring separation of powers and federalism principles is nonetheless
likewise indeterminate and subject to conflicting interpretations.247 One
place where history might instruct us is to look at is the objective facts of
America’s political and social evolution. It is virtually incontestable to
argue that James Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution,
went to Philadelphia with a plan in hand to replace the Articles of
Confederation and strengthen considerably the power of the national
government.248 It is clear that is precisely what the Constitutional
Convention did.249 There is no doubt that the Civil War was fought, and
that bloody affair, at least temporarily, resolved any issues about the
supremacy of the national government over the states. It is verifiable
that the Civil War Amendments were a direct response to the Union
victory and the perceived problem on how to deal with the freedmen
after emancipation; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to
protect, at least, the black race against punitive legislation that took
245. But see id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In U.S. Term Limits, the Court invalidated an
Amendment to the Arkansas state constitution that put term limits on the length of time national
representatives can serve. Id. at 783.
246. For one view of the scholarship and a response to it, see Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
863 (1986).
247. See, e.g., the conflicting opinions between Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Thomas in U.S.
Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
248. Indeed, his writings before and after the Convention argued that the national government
ought to enjoy a veto over state laws, a proposal that was defeated by his fellow statesmen in
Philadelphia. Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution,
and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 215 (1979). Madison’s reading of
history told him that small republics are destined to fail if the mutability of legislation and factional
rule was not contained by a republican structure. See id.; James Madison, Vices of the Political
System of the United States, reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361 (1901); James Madison,
Of Ancient and Modern Confederacies, reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 369 (1901); Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 24, 1787), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 17 (1904).
249. See Christopher Wolfe, Understanding the 1787 Convention, 39 J. POLITICS 97 (1977).
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away their rights as free persons.250 History also is informative in
conveying that the national government centralized its authority more
after the post-1937 New Deal period. And finally, that America
remained burdened by a “separate but equal” doctrine until the Supreme
Court cast it off in several landmark rulings that declared an equal
protection mandate for integrated schools and, significantly, the
institutional capacity of the high court to enforce it.251
Another historical fact is that the terms of Section 5 are quite
explicit, and it is counter-intuitive to find an interpretation in history to
claim that it is vague. As written, Section 5 is a clear grant of legislative
authority to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by
appropriate legislation. In contrast, there is absolutely nothing in the
founding document that establishes the judiciary’s power to implement
its principles, let alone stake a claim that it is the only branch of
government to do so.252 One could even point out, as some have,253 that
meekly accepting the Court’s self-imposed claim to be the final arbiter
of constitutional interpretation is to cheapen the founding document and
what it represents. In other words, by “reconceiv[ing] the Constitution
to buttress [a] claim to interpretive supremacy [and] treating the
Constitution mainly as a set of legal restraints rather than an instrument
enabling self-government,” writes professor Christopher Eisgruber, “the
Court has made more plausible the idea that constitutional interpretation
is exclusively the province of lawyers—a professional elite who may
have no special insight into justice or politics but who are expert at the
manipulation of fine-grained rules.”254 In short, given the equality
principle and the Amendment that epitomizes it, a judicial (and perhaps
elitist) interpretation that saps the Amendment’s “lifeblood”255 and
drains its language of any equality meaning is simply not persuasive in
law, morality or politics. That kind of construction unduly complicates a
very simple idea: that all men are created equal.

250. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 1323 (1952).
251. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294
(1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
252. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, Judicial Supremacy and Constitutional Distortion, in
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE,
72-73 (2001).
253. Id. at 71-74.
254. Id. at 71. Or, as Greve puts it, “[The Court] has . . . brought us to the brink of being
unable to preempt the trial bar.” Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
93, 96 (2002).
255. Gressman, supra note 251.
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B. Institutional Competence
The Supreme Court should assume a more deferential role because
it more consistent with a history that respects the basic nationalism of
the founding design, along with a history that has reaffirmed (in the
Civil War, Depression, New Deal, desegregation and the attainment of
voting rights) the proper use of national authority as the country matured
culturally and socially.256 An integral component of that deference is to
acknowledge that the states are represented in the political process and
do not need extra judicial protection.257 And more significantly, that the
legislature has the institutional competence to study complex problems
of policy through the open deliberative process of many (instead of the
opinion writing proclivities of the few in closed chambers). The Court
must recognize that insisting on a time-bound version of federalism
inhibits what Justice Breyer calls a “necessary legislative flexibility,”258
which is the ability of the citizenry to have a meaningful voice in
government. As Breyer suggested in College Savings, the Court’s
tendency to treat Congress like an administrative agency in federalism
cases only discourages active participation in representative government
and, in the end, becomes a deprivation of freedom in an increasingly
sophisticated world.259 This frustration manifests itself further in
litigation where Congress’ good-faith efforts to remedy a social problem
are thwarted by a hostile judiciary that is never satisfied with the kind of
evidence that is compiled in the legislative record.260 As Justice Stevens
lamented in his dissent in College Savings, “the Court must shoulder the
burden of demonstrating why the judgment of the Congress of the
United States should not command our respect.”261
C. Doctrinal Incoherence
A judiciary committed to preserving its own power at the expense

256. See Paul C. Light, Government’s Greatest Achievements of the Past Half Century
(Reform Watch Brief # 2, November 2000), available at http://www.brook.edu/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2003) (Brookings Institute policy brief suggesting federal government often had great impact on
changing America and the globe). See also Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 702 (1999).
257. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
215 (2000).
258. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 702-04.
260. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 630-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
261. 527 U.S. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of all others in a political system emphasizing a dual government of
shared powers262 wreaks havoc with the rule of law. Understanding the
limits of Congress’ Section 5 power is notoriously difficult because the
doctrinal position a Justice stakes out is fact-sensitive and always
affected by a variety of legal and political factors.263 Thus, the Court’s
decision to wield its power and directly tip the balance of federalism
towards the states is significant, for it pragmatically influences how
citizens, and litigants, order their legal expectations in their dealings
with the legal process. Court watchers and Supreme Court Justices have
expressed concern that the Rehnquist Court’s firm commitment of
respecting, say, a state’s “dignity”264 threatens long-standing doctrinal
interpretations of pre-emption, Commerce Clause jurisprudence and
administrative law.265 As Justice Stevens argued in Florida Prepaid, the
Court’s new federalism has great potential to disrupt the national
uniformity of patent laws; and significantly, puts too much faith in state
judiciaries to understand technical legal rules they have little familiarity
with, while ironically, removing the federal bench who has the requisite
expertise from their adjudication.266 The creation and ambiguity of the
Court’s innovative legal standards, like the plain statement rule and the
reformulated congruence and proportionality test in Boerne will only
exacerbate the confusion in the lower courts, who are trying to make
sense of them, especially in light of past precedent that the Court is
systematically overturning in its frenzy to uphold state sovereignty.267 In
short, the threat of having “shifting legislative majorities”268 disrupt the
262. “In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.” James Madison, Federalist No. 39, in THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS 245 (Rossiter ed., 1961).
263. For an argument claiming judicial decisonmaking is affected primarily by political
variable, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
(1993).
264. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
265. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 93, 110-17.
See also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
658 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fed. Maritime Comm. v. S. Car. State Ports Authority, 535
U.S. 743, 1881-89 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
266. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens also notes that
usurping patent authority contradicts the reason why the Federal Circuit was created. Id.
267. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996), overturning, Pennsylvania
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid v. Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999), overturning, Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co. of Ala. State Docks
Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
268. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997), where Justice Kennedy
rationalized that if Congress instead of the Court was able to determine what the Constitution meant

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss3/2

46

Banks: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
BANKS1.DOC

2003]

5/5/03 12:07 PM

SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

471

balance of federalism has been inexplicably and illegitimately been
replaced by the shifting coalitions of a divided (often five-to-four)
Rehnquist Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The significance of Bush v. Gore269 is manifested in the Rehnquist
Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Although seven Justices in Bush
perceived that there was an equal protection problem with the challenged
Florida recount in the 2000 presidential election,270 three Justices
comprising the core group of the five that often control federalism
outcomes271 suggested that the Supreme Court needed to step into the
political thicket and decide the outcome because this was not an
“ordinary election, but [one dealing with] an election for the President of
the United States.”272 In discharging that perceived duty Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed that the usual judicial deference that federal courts
give state court rulings in election cases cannot obtain.273 As a result,
the Justices selected the President of the United States and established,
once again, that it is the Supreme Court.
The pattern of Section 5 cases decided by the Supreme Court
epitomizes the same sort of judicial arrogance that characterizes the
Court’s ill-conceived involvement in Bush v. Gore.274 By refusing to
abdicate any of its judicial authority, the Court is truly the final arbiter of
social policy, and it is likely to remain so until the five-to-four voting
bloc in federalism cases is dissipates. Therein lies the significance of
Bush as well, because the Court’s selection of a Republican candidate
insures that the controlling coalition will remain intact for years to come.
When it does disappear, as it surely will in time in the interest of
republican liberty, the Court will confront the messy task of trying to
restore its own legitimacy and the proper, historic relationship that
existed between the national government and states before the Rehnquist
Court asserted its judicial will on the nation.

substantively, “[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively
circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V.”
269. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
270. Id. at 100 (per curiam).
271. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by JJ. Scalia and Thomas). Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy complete the frequently decisive voting coalition.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 112-13.
274. See Banks, supra note 21, at 237-64.
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